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Contemporary psychiatry is becoming more biologically oriented in the attempt to elicit a biological rationale of
mental diseases. Although mental disorders comprise mostly functional abnormalities, there is a substantial overlap
between neurology and psychiatry in addressing cognitive disturbances. In schizophrenia, the presence of cognitive
impairment prior to the onset of psychosis and early after its manifestation suggests that some neurocognitive
abnormalities precede the onset of psychosis and may represent a trait marker. These cognitive alterations may
arise from functional disconnectivity, as no significant brain damage has been found. In this review we aim to
revise A.R. Luria’s systematic approach used in the neuropsychological evaluation of cognitive functions, which was
primarily applied in patients with neurological disorders and in the cognitive evaluation in schizophrenia and other
related disorders. As proposed by Luria, cognitive processes, associated with higher cortical functions, may
represent functional systems that are not localized in narrow, circumscribed areas of the brain, but occur among
groups of concertedly working brain structures, each of which makes its own particular contribution to the
organization of the functional system. Current developments in neuroscience provide evidence of functional
connectivity in the brain. Therefore, Luria’s approach may serve as a frame of reference for the analysis and
interpretation of cognitive functions in general and their abnormalities in schizophrenia in particular. Having said
that, modern technology, as well as experimental evidence, may help us to understand the brain better and lead us
towards creating a new classification of cognitive functions. In schizophrenia research, multidisciplinary approaches
must be utilized to address specific cognitive alterations. The relationships among the components of cognitive
functions derived from the functional connectivity of the brain may provide an insight into cognitive machinery.
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connectivity, Temporal perceptionIntroduction
Recent developments in the neurosciences are bringing
together psychiatry and neurology, which were separated
for nearly a century. The successful search for biological
markers for schizophrenia, such as functional and struc-
tural abnormalities of the brain [1], cognitive deficits [2],
and minor neurological signs [3,4], have shifted psych-
iatry to a more biologically-oriented branch of medical
science. The importance of understanding structural and
functional abnormalities derives from its potential im-
pact on behavioral performance and particularly on* Correspondence: yuliya.zaytseva@gmail.com
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unless otherwise stated.cognitive functioning. Thus, cognitive deficits in schizo-
phrenia go beyond the presence of positive and negative
symptoms in the prodromal phase of the illness [5,6],
becoming more severe during the acute phase and re-
main in remission. Neuropsychological studies of schizo-
phrenia have a long history, and substantial disturbances
in motor and perceptual processes, spatial functions,
verbal and non-verbal memory, executive functioning,
and difficulties concentrating or maintaining attention
have been demonstrated [7-11]. It has been repeatedly
shown that the degree of cognitive deficit plays an im-
portant role in determining the prognosis of recovery in
these patients and has a great impact on social function-
ing [12,13]. Despite extensive research, cognitive deficits
have not been found to sufficiently distinguish between
schizophrenia and schizophrenia spectrum disordersal. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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of the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) [15]. Could
cognitive alterations in schizophrenia be specified in the
same way as they are specified in neurology? Indeed, the
clinico-anatomical approach dominant in neurology does
not seem directly applicable to psychiatry. This import-
ant issue must be addressed.
Schizophrenia has often been considered as a brain
disease. Structural neuroimaging has revealed a reduc-
tion in the intracranial volume with a similar decrease in
the volume of white matter in schizophrenia. Regions
most consistently showing clusters of decreased grey
matter detected by voxel-based morphometry (VBM) are
the insula, anterior cingulate cortex, inferior and medial
frontal gyrus, middle and inferior temporal gyri, amygdala,
and thalamus [16,17]. The decreased density of grey
matter does not, however, exceed 2-3%, as suggested by
longitudinal studies and these neuroanatomical alterations
may be associated with antipsychotic treatment [18,19].
To date, there is no clear understanding of what the
nature of cognitive deficits is in schizophrenia. On the one
hand, the whole brain volume tends to correlate with
general intelligence, as well as with a range of specific
cognitive functions, as shown in comparisons between
normal controls and schizophrenia patients [20]. From the
topological view, the prefrontal cortex is associated with
executive function. The temporal lobe, hippocampus, and
parahippocampal gyrus correlate with cognitive abilities,
such as performance speed and accuracy, memory, execu-
tive function, verbal competence and the ability to form
abstract categories. Nevertheless, cognitive dysfunction
can’t be fully explained by grey-matter loss, and the pat-
tern of cognitive deficits seems to be more diverse than
the pattern of structural alterations.
Alternatively, cognitive deficits might emerge from the
altered functional connectivity of the brain. The “discon-
nectivity theory of schizophrenia” implies an abnormal
pattern of connections among distinct brain regions
[21]. This disrupted connectivity may involve either ex-
aggerated connections or weakened pathways and result
in altered functional integration [22,23]. Patients have
revealed widespread functional connectivity deficits in a
large network of brain regions which primarily affect
connectivity between the frontal cortex and posterior
regions and occur irrespective of task context [23]. It
has also been shown that deficits in attention and
working memory are correlated with distinct alterations
in functional coupling, particularly hyperactivity of the
default-mode network, suggesting schizophrenia-related
dysregulation of inhibitory brain circuits [24,25]. The
question remains whether we are able to identify cogni-
tive markers based on functional disconnectivity in
schizophrenia.Despite growing empirical evidence of cognitive distur-
bances and structural and functional brain alterations in
schizophrenia, their underlying mechanisms still seems
difficult to uncover. This issue is related to a larger prob-
lem within cognitive neuroscience – the lack of a valid
taxonomy of cognitive functions [26]. A strong theoretical
framework is needed to make solid inferences about cog-
nitive processes from structural and functional brain find-
ings. An attempt to stratify cognitive functions was made
by the eminent Russian neuropsychologist A.R. Luriaa,
who categorized cognitive functions into three functional
blocks, each of which makes its equal and unique contri-
bution to the cognitive machinery. His concept was uti-
lized for many years as a basis for analyzing cognitive
distortions in neurological patients and proved to be in-
formative and predictive in terms of outcomes.
In the present review, we aim to combine the system-
atic approach proposed by Luria with contemporary at-
tempts to systematize current knowledge in cognitive
research and underline some challenges in neuropsych-
ology in order to improve diagnostics of schizophrenia
and related disorders.
Review
The main principles of Luria’s approach
In his book “Principles of Neuropsychology (The Working
Brain)”, Luria proposed a model of cerebral organization
which assumed a specific distinction of functions operat-
ing as components of functional systems [27]. Luria con-
ceived the brain as divided into three principal blocks.
The first block regulates arousal and the state of vigilance,
providing the brain with a stable basis for the organization
of its various processes. The components of the first block
are located in the upper and lower parts of the brains stem
and particularly in the thalamus, which controls wakeful-
ness. The second block processes the receipt, analysis, and
storage of information. The specific sensory inputs are
analysed and integrated into more complex sensations,
which are later synthesized into even more complex per-
ceptions. These perceptions contain information coming
from various sensory modalities and enable the construc-
tion of scenes. The second functional block includes tem-
poral processing, i.e. the recognition of simultaneity or the
succession of events [28,29]. Simultaneous processing as-
sumes the arrangement of incoming information into a
holistic pattern or gestalt that can be integrated or “sur-
veyed” in its entirety (as in visual recognition). Successive
processing refers to encoding information into a discrete,
serial order where the detection of one portion of the in-
formation depends on its temporal position relative to
other material (acoustic recognition, speech processing,
reading, writing, etc.). The third functional block of the
brain comprises the frontal lobes and addresses the forma-
tion of intention, programming, regulation, and control of
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plex tasks and also monitors ongoing actions, comparing
the effects of the actions taken with the initial intentions,
as hypothesized, for instance, in the reafference principle
and its potential applications [30-32].
Luria claimed that any form of psychological activity is
a system involving the simultaneous operation of the
three functional units, and he stressed that patients’ in-
ability to perform a certain task does not necessarily spe-
cify an area of brain dysfunction because each behavioral
task requires the coordinated and integrated activity of a
number of cortical and subcortical areas, all contributing
differently to the execution of the task [33,34]. In other
words, at a phenomenological level, the psychological
functions are not restricted to the single location in the
brain but rather are distributed as different modular com-
ponents across the system. This explanation of the re-
latedness of cognitive functions to neuroanatomy has its
roots in the double dissociation theory, originally pro-
posed by Hans-Lukas Teuber [35]. This theory postulates
that independent functions are associated with independ-
ent anatomical substrates. In Luria interpretation, a par-
ticular area of the brain usually represents a single
“factor”, that subserves a several different systems and
supports various psychological functions. The pattern of
interacting factors responsible for a given behavior is
called a functional system. Each area of the brain par-
ticipates in numerous functional systems, as has been
demonstrated in numerous studies using imaging tech-
nology, like functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) [eg. 36-38].
The concept of a syndrome, as an extension of these
principles, was pivotal in Luria’s concept, whereby a syn-
drome was identified as a constellation of factors and
symptoms. Thus, Luria’s clinical method entailed the
accumulation of converging evidence from many tasks
to define a syndrome. The syndrome, then, emerged as a
common cognitive process that was disrupted in seem-
ingly disparate tasks. This clinical method, in turn, allowed
Luria to define various areas of regional specialization in
the brain and to map sets of functional systems that ope-
rate at various levels of generality within and between
these brain areas. The research process, that Luria utilized,
involved the definition of a variety of syndromes by identi-
fying one or more cognitive processes that are common to
tasks performed by subjects with brain damage.
Luria’s diagnostic tests consist of numerous specific
procedures which are designed to isolate dysfunctions;
as compared to the more general assessment character-
istics of other neuropsychological tests [for instance see
39-41]. It includes an evaluation of all the domains ne-
cessary for a complete neuropsychological examination
(motor functions, sensory skills (auditory, tactile, and
visual), verbal skills (expressive speech, receptive speech,reading, and writing), spatial skills, arithmetic abilities,
memory, and intellectual skills. Further development
and interpretation of neuropsychological tests intro-
duced by Luria was subsequently continued by his
students and successors [42-50].
Luria’s concept was considered to be a blueprint for the
development of neuropsychological tests and also for the
specification of cognitive functions. Naglieri & Dass [51]
based their theory of human intelligence (PASS theory:
Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, and Successive) on
Luria’s approach. Their composition of the functional
system comprising planning, attention, and simulta-
neous/successive processing attempted to integrate cog-
nitive functioning and became an alternative approach
to intelligence which had traditionally included only
verbal, nonverbal, and quantitative tests. The authors
claimed that intelligence has some prerequisites origin-
ating in basic cognitive processing and precludes verbal
achievement tests, such as vocabulary. Brain functions
are considered to be the building blocks conceptualized
within a cognitive-processing framework. The PASS
theory was operationalized in the Cognitive Assessment
System (CAS) [52], and its constructs are strongly re-
lated to the achievement. One of the purposes of the
CAS is to anticipate levels of academic performance on
the basis of levels of cognitive functioning. The results
provided some support for Luria’s approach [26].
Luria’s test battery
Neuropsychological tests are traditionally divided into
two main groups, quantitative (psychometric) tests, which
are focused on the achievement of results in a standard
set time, and qualitative, process-oriented tests targeting
performance and qualifications of errors (Luria’s ap-
proach). Orientation towards achievement implies error
detection and quantifies the degree of the impairment.
However, when the testing procedure focuses on the
process, one can then conceive the subject’s strategies, the
difficulties that the subject might experience while
performing the task, and predict the kind and amount of
help a subject might need to successfully complete the
task. Besides, Luria employed a “single-case” methodology
compared to the orientation towards group statistics in
psychometric studies. Luria’s approach is centred on the
patient (on the specifics of his/her mental processes and
personality), whereas the psychometric approach focuses
on the disease or the defect. In the latter case, a patient is
evaluated within a statistical continuum.
An essential feature of Luria’s tests is their synthetic
evaluation of complex forms of cognition, such as
speech, writing, or problem solving. This enables a dy-
namic analysis of difficulties discovered in tests [53]. An
individualized, qualitative approach allows symptoms to
be combined into syndromes in which deficits and
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place in an ongoing phenomenological and dynamic
interaction between examiner and patient, the patient
benefits from feedback, as it provides the possibility for
change and improvement in performance.
Moreover, different levels of cognitive processes, like
direct sensorimotor actions and reactions mediated by
the level of complex operations, or speech, can be ad-
dressed. This approach also makes it possible to extract
specific information on the patient’s present cognitive
capacities, which might be useful for designing an indi-
vidual rehabilitation program and making optimal use of
the remaining intact functions [54,55].
Despite these advantages, Luria’s tests have also been
widely criticized. One significant drawback has been the
lack of direct evaluation of the tests and controlled scor-
ing. Previously, scoring was determined by the clinician’s
personal assessment based on his/her experience and
knowledge rather than other normative data. Standard-
ized neuropsychological test batteries have demonstrated
their greatest reliability and validity in patients with
focal, well-defined neurological diseases. In these pa-
tients, the test profiles typically highlight focal areas of
strengths and weaknesses in the functions of the brain.
However, the clinical utility of standard tests batteries
and their reliance on scaled score differences is limited
when evaluating patients with severe or diffuse neurobe-
havioral disorders [56].
The development of methods for the quantitative as-
sessment of Luria’s test results is based on analyses of
the test structure. This western influence provides the
advantages of psychometric methods (objectivity, reli-
ability, validity, standardization) without sacrificing the
deep insights of neuropsychology as developed by Luria.
It was Charles Golden and his associates who attempted
to standardize and quantify Luria’s methods with the
Luria-Nebraska test [54]. This was welcomed by many,
and translations were made into several languages. Lur-
ia’s ideas influenced the development of many modern
neuropsychological batteries, primarily in the procedur-
ally oriented development approach to psychometric
testing [57]. This includes a two-step procedure which
starts the testing with a standard kit (vertical section)
with a subsequent limitation of the test procedures to
the alleged defect in the second step (horizontal section).
It is assumed that such a horizontal section will provide
a fairly complete overview of the patient’s cognitive
capacities.
Many neuropsychologists now use rather flexible ap-
proaches (not one standardized test battery, but separate
tests with different batteries) to adequately fulfil the pur-
pose of the neuropsychological examination and provide
a patient with more integrative neuropsychological as-
sessment. The standardization of the neuropsychologicaltest battery began with Luria and the development of a
protocol for neuropsychological assessments. It included
elements of quantitative assessments of symptoms with
a score of “no deficits, weak, moderate, or severe” [27].
Further research was aimed primarily at the differenti-
ation of these criteria and the operationalization of the
decision process. Currently, there are several options
for standardization and quantification methods of Lur-
ia’s neuropsychological examination of both adults and
children [58-62].
Specificity of the developed scoring system based on
the qualitative analysis [59] lies in two related proce-
dures which are distinct in value and applicability. First,
results from each probe are compiled, and a list of pos-
sible disturbances is made. This makes it possible to
identify a typical pattern and to qualify the parameters
(symptoms) on the basis of their common relatedness to
brain structures to compare the degree of deficit in dif-
ferent parts of the brain, and to determine the stability
of symptoms during follow-up. Positive or negative alter-
ations in the neuropsychological status during the sec-
ond testing can be estimated on the basis of the
disappearance/occurrence of disturbances. Scoring also
makes it possible to determine the total score for each
deficiency of each cognitive function and to estimate the
dynamics of the subject’s status by longitudinal tracking
during the rehabilitation procedure. Luria’s testing also
allows reducing or expanding the testing procedure. The
battery allows further improvement in formalization by
applying procedures based on statistics, although in its
present form it is without a doubt effective and useful
for diagnostics also in neuropsychiatric facilities.
Thus, Luria’s style of evaluation comprises a single-
case approach with a flexible set of testing procedures
that allows a synthetic evaluation of the cognitive func-
tions, making it possible to dissect cognitive function
into several functional domains. Psychometric methods
are focused on achievement, and provide an index score
of the severity of cognitive impairment that facilitates
the tracking of cognitive functioning during follow-up.
When using evaluation of specific cognitive functions by
standard psychometric tests two patients who have been
evaluated with the same score severity may have qualita-
tively different cognitive disturbances. This might explain
why experimental paradigms that frequently include mul-
tiple cognitive factors and performance on different tasks
measuring cognitive processes often correlate weakly,
reflecting the ambiguity of even well-known cognitive
constructs [63]. Therefore, Luria’s approach, being focused
on the process, allows the characterization of the types of
mistakes and tracking of them throughout the testing pro-
cedure. The commonality of the deficits across the num-
ber of tasks may identify the impaired networks. Thus,
Luria’s style of evaluation might prove especially helpful in
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tivity of brain networks.
Studies of cognition in schizophrenia using Luria’s test
battery
Attempts to outline neuropsychological aspects of spe-
cific psychiatric disorders have grown substantially since
mid1970’s [64,65]. The Luria-Nebraska Neuropsycho-
logical Battery (LNNB) has been one of the most widely
used standardized and comprehensive tools in research
on neuropsychological functioning. Neuropsychological
research studies have long been concerned with the
presence or absence of structural abnormalities in the
brains of patients with schizophrenia, attempting to differ-
entiate between their “organic” and “functional” deficits
[66-69]. They were also performed together with common
referral questions for psychiatric patients, which were
used for differential diagnosis. Later on, there was an at-
tempt to merge separate cognitive deficiencies into syn-
dromes resulting in diverse cognitive profiles in different
diagnostic categories and also speaking for the exist-
ence of associated brain mechanisms [70,71]. The stud-
ies often described the patients’ cognitive profiles,
drawing attention to the particular disturbances within
Luria’s functional blocks [72-76]. Their primary focus
lay rather within the deficit specification than in the ex-
tent of disintegration of functional blocks and potential
brain mechanisms.
Luria revisited: an extension of neuropsychological
performances
Along with the advancement of neuroimaging technolo-
gies, Luria’s systematic approach began to be applied as a
conceptual framework. As an example, a method to study
kinetic apraxia, initially proposed by Luria [27], the Fist-
Edge-Palm-Test that requires sequential movements, is
widely used in psychiatry, particularly for the study of
neurocognitive deficits/neurological soft signs in schizo-
phrenia. At the behavioural level, the disturbance in kin-
etic praxis may result in the inability to correct errors,
which includes both the number of errors and the type of
errors (errors of serial organization, such as individual
mistakes, unstable tendencies of program expansion, inert
expansion of the program, echopraxic movements and
perseveration, and deautomatization). Motor programs re-
quire constant attentional control and can be linked to
performance decrements found under dual-task condi-
tions involving sensorimotor tasks. While a series of stud-
ies failed to demonstrate dual-task deficits involving two
cognitive tasks, performance decrements in dual motor
tasks have been described [77] which are indicative of
attention-control decrements in schizophrenic patients
under dual-task conditions and may be linked to pre-
frontal and motor pathways. Such phenomena have beenobserved in complex movements, specifically, rhythmic
timing, and may be linked to elementary motor persever-
ation [78]. Interestingly, fMRI studies demonstrated acti-
vation of bilateral premotor and left parietal areas and the
left cerebellum, as well as right sensorimotor and supple-
mentary motor areas while performing the Fist-Edge-Palm
Task [4,79]. As in a study of Rao et al., using psycho-
physiological interaction analysis (PPI), the authors found
significant increases in functional connectivity between
the bilateral sensorimotor cortex and the right inferior
and middle frontal cortex during performance of the Fist-
Edge-Palm Task in comparison to simple motor tasks
(single palm tapping, pronation/supination task) [80].
These findings suggested a specific impairment in schizo-
phrenia patients due to altered frontal connectivity, which
is consistent with Luria’s original proposal. The traditional
motor task developed by Luria has been incorporated into
other tests. For example, the Neurological Evaluation Scale
[81] and the Cambridge Neurological Inventory [82] have
included several motor sequencing tasks designed by Luria
for the evaluation of neurological signs in schizophrenia
research. These signs are believed to target features [83]
and endophenotypes [4,84] of schizophrenia. In particular,
the Fist-Edge-Palm Task, has proven to be both sensitive
and effective in discriminating patients with schizophrenia
and individuals at risk for schizophrenia [85] as well as in
discriminating of patients with schizophrenia and schizo-
phrenia spectrum disorders from healthy controls [86].
Another application of Luria’s framework is the introduc-
tion of the taxonomy of executive functions based on
neuropsychological perspectives and recent advancements
in brain connectivity. The meta-analysis of Niendam et al.
[87], refers to Luria’s ideas on the multidimensional struc-
ture of executive functioning that comprises the initiation
of goal-directed activity, planning steps to achieve a goal,
and subsequent controlling of a goal by inhibiting incorrect
responses, as well as an additional domain of working
memory that helps to maintain and manipulate information
during task performance [88]. Lesion studies gave to the
prefrontal cortex a pivotal role in executive functioning.
However, neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that,
depending on the task, other areas (posterior parietal areas
and the anterior cingulate cortices) also become involved.
A common pattern of activation of frontal-cingulate-
parietal-subcortical connectivity supports the idea of the
superordinate control network that is recruited during
executive-task performance. Assuming that executive func-
tioning is altered in schizophrenia, the proposed model
and the contribution of the modular (prefrontal) versus
shared (fronto-parietal connectivity) should be tested.
Current views on cognition
Luria prefigured the direction of the cognitive neuro-
biological research. As he claimed, cognitive functions
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acting elements that organize into spatial and temporal
patterns [27]. The interconnections between cognitive
functions, like visual perception and attention [89],
working memory and executive functioning [90] atten-
tion and working memory [91], and temporal process-
ing [92] correspond to the present knowledge of brain
connectivity. On a cellular level the interconnectivity of
the brain indicates that there is closeness among differ-
ent brain areas. The integrity of distinct neuronal struc-
tures is essential for the availability of specific cognitive
functions [93]. Thus, one could expect that if one of
the brain areas is functionally altered, it may affect
other brain areas involved in the corresponding cogni-
tive function.
Some of the diagnostic techniques, like electroenceph-
alography (EEG), which depicts electrical activity in the
brain, and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), which
measures the blood oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) sig-
nal and serves as an indirect indicator of neuronal activ-
ity, are particularly sensitive to the delineation of brain
areas. These techniques provide an insight into cognitive
processes that are not readily studied by behavioral mea-
sures. The term “connectomics” was recently coined to
define a set of neural connections forming the human
brain [94]. Analyses of whole brain activity indicate that
fairly all cognitive functions are associated with the acti-
vation of networks of widely distributed cortical areas
rather than of individual specialized structure [95,96]. It
has been postulated that cognitive operations emerge
from coordinated activity in the distributed brain net-
works. Assuming the multidimensional organization of
cognitive functions, the critical question that remains
open is how to identify the relevant neural networks re-
sponsible for specific cognitive capacities, given that
many brain regions are probably associated with a num-
ber of cognitive capacities. The one-to–one relation of
brain regions to capacity, which is a core assumption of
some proponents in cognitive neuropsychology [97],
does not seem to apply to many psychiatric disorders, es-
pecially schizophrenia. Modern approaches based on
brain-imaging research suggest rather complex structural-
functional interactions.
Recent evidence suggests that functional connectivity
is closely related to underlying structural connectivity
[98]. Structural networks provide an anatomical frame-
work for functional interactions [99]. In other words, we
need to understand the structural connections in the
brain to predict possible functional interactions. In areas
that have a structural hierarchy, such as sensory net-
works, the functional activity pattern can be predicted.
The interhemispheric coherence may be preserved by
the active role of subcortical structures, including those
of the brain stem [100].Functional neuroimaging is being increasingly applied
to the issues of connectivity and communication among
different areas in the brain. In the absence of a task, the
cerebral cortex generates rich and consistent spatio-
temporal patterns of activity [101]. These spontaneously
emerging fluctuations in the resting state appear to map
the cortex and show amplitude similar to the fluctua-
tions that are produced when performing a task [102].
One of the possible explanations is that the spontaneous
fluctuations represent the readiness of the system to
react to stimuli and keep the system close to the firing
threshold [103].
A large body of neuroimaging studies have identified
functional maps in various brain regions. Resting-state
networks are slightly discrepant across different studies
[104-107]. Although no classification has been explicitly
proposed, M. Mesulam classifies networks according to
their potential functional role in cognitive processing: a
spatial attention network in the posterior parietal cortex
and frontal eye fields, a language network in Wernicke’s
and Broca’s areas, an explicit memory network in the
hippocampal–entorhinal complex and inferior parietal
cortex, a face-object recognition network in midtem-
poral and temporopolar cortices, and a working memory-
executive function network in prefrontal and inferior
parietal cortices [108]. Along with the specific, content-
dependant networks, triple-theory networks were intro-
duced. These large-scale networks include a salience
network (SN) involving the dorsal-anterior cingulate
and anterior insula regions, which mediate the selection
of salient external and interceptive signals [109,110], a
central executive network (CEN) consisting of regions
in the middle and inferior prefrontal and parietal corti-
ces engaged in many higher-level cognitive tasks and
thought to be involved in adaptive cognitive control,
and a default-mode network (DMN) consisting of re-
gions in the medio-frontal cortex and posterior cingu-
late relating to resting-state or internally focused tasks
that may be involved in attention to internal emotional
states or self-referential processing [111]. The existing
evidence supports a general role for the SN in switch-
ing between these CEN and DMN networks [110,112].
Another approach to identify multiple functional net-
works is to assign them to ‘processing’ or ‘control’ net-
work categories [113], where processing-type networks
are more static and modular, and control networks are
dynamic and flexible and are able to adapt to various
tasks. From the perspective of temporal dynamics, the high
similarity in the relationships among brain areas within
somato-motor and visual systems and the default-mode
system might indicate that these systems are relatively sta-
tionary, whereas other networks, such as task-control sys-
tems, might have more dynamic connections [113].
Frontal-parietal networks (FPN) that include parts of the
Zaytseva et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine  (2015) 10:4 Page 7 of 11lateral prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex are
thought to be involved in modulation of the top-down con-
trol [114]. The role of these specific networks in different
tasks that require control has not yet been clarified.
Current evidence suggests that brain networks may
interact while performing certain cognitive tasks. Thus,
positive correlations among functionally related brain re-
gions and negative correlations among brain regions
represent theoretically opposed functional roles of the
networks. In particular, negative correlations have been
observed between a set of regions routinely exhibiting
increases in activity during attention-demanding tasks
(task-positive regions) and a separate set of regions rou-
tinely exhibiting decreases in activity (task-negative re-
gions) [115,116].
The notion that different functions are represented in
different brain areas or have different algorithms which
are interconnected leads to the question of how the ac-
tivity of these different regions is temporarily coordi-
nated. It has also been suggested that cognitive
processing occurs through a stream of discrete units or
epochs rather than as a continuous flow of neuronal ac-
tivity, i.e. that mental activity evolves through a se-
quence of quasi-stable coordination states [29,117,118].
EEG and direct neuronal recording [119,120], have doc-
umented that cortical neurons belonging to specific,
but spatially separated, functional clusters show corre-
lated patterns of spontaneous activity over time during
resting states. The topographic representation of the
EEG scalp electrical field affords temporal resolution at
the millisecond level, yet does not change randomly or
continuously over time, remaining stable over periods
of approximately 100 ms. Such quasi-stable and unique
topographic distributions of the electrical-field poten-
tial have been termed “microstates” [121,122]. Accord-
ingly, parsing the EEG data stream into microstates
should lead to a putative dictionary of functional brain
units. Different types of cognition have been found to
be associated with different types of microstates [123]
and suggest microstates as potential candidates for
basic psychophysiological units of cognition.
In a taxonomy of functions proposed by E. Pöppel
which is based on neuropsychological observations, a
distinction is made between “what-functions” represent-
ing the content of consciousness, and “how-functions”
representing the logistics of neuronal processing (like
temporal control, attention or activation) [124]. Both
functional domains are necessary and sufficient for cog-
nition. Their temporal coordination is provided by neur-
onal coordination mechanisms, which are expressed as
oscillatory processes in neuronal populations. On the
basis of such neuronal oscillations, the brain can provide
itself with independent temporal states. Temporal pro-
cessing in the brain is hierarchically organized, anddifferent mechanisms are responsible for the transitions
from simultaneity to non-simultaneity, to temporal order,
to the subjective present, and to the estimation of dur-
ation. Each next step requires successful processing at the
lower processing levels [29,93]. The Russian physiologist I.
M. Sechenov emphasized the role of time in auditory and
proprioceptive sensory systems (in contrast to the percep-
tion of space, where the leading role is given to vision and
skin sensitivity) [125]. For many years, the spatial connec-
tions and the temporal coordination of cognitive functions
were difficult to grasp, but neuroimaging methods present
new possibilities to study the precise mechanisms of cog-
nitive processing.
Assuming a two-dimensional model of cognitive
functions, as well as their hierarchical organization,
cognition must be examined from the perspective of spa-
tio-temporal connectivity. Large-scale networks might
correspond to the proposed “neuronal workspace” that
consists of a distributed set of cortical neurons that form a
discrete spatio-temporal pattern of activity [126,127].
Functional networks may be organized according to a
hierarchy of temporal scales driven by structural and func-
tional connections and supporting the existence of a hier-
archical functional organization across time scales [128].
Conclusion
Future directions
The development of current neuropsychology reflects
the universal trend to substitute the static approach fo-
cused on specific brain lesions for a dynamic approach
that embodies the dynamics of brain-behavior interac-
tions. In psychiatry, this issue is becoming central, as
many psychiatric disorders present with subtle structural
and robust functional brain alterations. Luria’s approach,
which was initially introduced in neurology, made a sub-
stantial contribution not only to the diagnostics of cognitive
symptoms and the development of neurorehabilitation
strategies, but also pioneered a theoretical concept of cogni-
tion as a dynamic system. Due to the growing necessity for
operationalized cognitive criteria in psychiatry, the
major role in the evaluation of cognitive functions has
been given to psychometric tools, which provide a com-
prehensive measurement of the severity of cognitive
dysfunction. Nowadays, psychometric tests are often
preferred to Luria’s neuropsychological evaluation, that
is oriented to the process and provide only limited
scoring for the evaluation. The clinical test utility as
well as the conceptual value of Luria’s systematic approach
was overlooked. In the scope of the theoretical and prac-
tical issues in psychiatry, Luria’s concept of cognitive func-
tions as dynamic systems should be revisited.
From the theoretical standpoint, the major benefit of
Luria’s systematic approach lies in well-structured and well-
defined integrative cognitive components and contains
Zaytseva et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine  (2015) 10:4 Page 8 of 11information about their possible interactions. It provides a
theoretical framework for the development of a new
taxonomy of cognitive functions desperately needed in
psychiatry and cognitive neuroscience.
Patients with schizophrenia tend to have a less strongly
integrated, more diverse profile of functional brain con-
nectivity. Alongside the cognitive deficits, however, brain
networks in schizophrenia patients are robustly repeated,
pointing to a possible benefit of the schizophrenia connec-
tome [129]. It is absolutely critical in the field of psycho-
pathology to examine interactions between systems, as the
complexity and range of impairments present in schizo-
phrenia are hardly due to impairments in a single system
[130]. In this regard, Luria’s neuropsychological measures
can help in making inferences about the cognitive pro-
cesses related to certain brain networks.
Therefore, Luria’s conceptual framework of intercon-
nections and its application in evaluative measures rep-
resent potentially constructive contributions to current
psychiatric research in schizophrenia. From the practical
standpoint, the qualitative evaluation of the cognitive
domains might be beneficial for differential diagnosis
and prognosis.
In Luria’s own opinion, his most important accomplish-
ment was the theory of complex dynamic systems in
neuropsychology [53]. Since the investigation of specific
disturbances of cognitive functions is very important for
understanding the aetiology and pathogenesis of schizo-
phrenia, it is essential to take into account the results of
their experimental evaluation. The ingenuity of Luria’s
qualitative analyses may help to do so and continue to in-
fluence future neuropsychological studies in schizophrenia
and psychiatry in general.
Endnote
aAlexander Romanovich Luria (1902–1977) is univer-
sally recognized as one of the distinguished psycholo-
gists of our time. Born on July 16, 1902 in the city of
Kazan, Russia, Luria first studied at the local university,
and was influenced by the works of Wundt, Ebbinghaus,
and Freud. In 1922, he was invited to the Moscow State
University, where he joined Alexey N. Leontiev’s group
and met Lev Vygotsky, whose influence on the develop-
ment of a systematic theory of neuropsychology he con-
sidered to be “large and essential”. From his studies of
localized brain lesions at the Rehabilitation Hospital of
Nervous Diseases in Kisegach in the Southern Urals
during World War II and later at the Moscow Institute
of Neurosurgery, Luria initiated the field of neuropsych-
ology. His international acclaim was confirmed in a
series of publications and at conferences in the post-
Stalinist era. In 1973 he became a member of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States.
Luria continued his work at the Moscow Institute ofNeurosurgery and the Moscow State University and
remained highly productive into old age. He died in
Moscow on August 14, 1977. The introduction of higher
cortical functions as compound dynamic systems was
made by A.R. Luria (1973) [25], who established the
system-dynamic approach based on empirical studies
and clinical observations (lesion studies).
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